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Abstract
This paper explores climate change – agriculture 
debates in Malawi in view of the increasing interest and 
funding pledges for the agricultural sector in a changing 
climate. While there is increasing evidence of how climate 
change may affect Malawian agricultural systems, and 
a growing body of literature on possible response 
strategies, less is known about how priorities are made, 
by whom and with what outcomes. This matters because 
climate-related funding can be a major factor for how 
the agricultural sector develops, in Malawi as in other 
countries across Africa.
This paper is the first of its kind to analyse policy 
discussions on climate change and agriculture in the 
country. The primary focus is the national level, but some 
of the implications of national debates at sub-national 
levels, and the questions they raise, are also discussed. 
The paper shows how the climate change-agriculture 
debate at national levels is largely framed as an issue of 
managing the additional risks on agricultural production 
systems. The two dominant narratives in Malawi centre 
on, first, the need to make agriculture robust in the face 
of climate change, and second, to consider agriculture 
as part of a broader development focus. Implications of 
these narratives are discussed in the case of four 
strategies, namely conservation agriculture, drought-
resistant varieties, agroforestry, and index-based weather 
insurance.
The paper argues that key factors to understand policy 
processes and their outcomes in Malawi include the 
struggle for leadership and coordination among key 
government actors, the government’s attachment to the 
subsidy programme, and donors’ strong influence on 
the policy agenda as well as actual strategies. The paper 
shows that current debates create a situation with 
incoherent policy responses, reducing the likelihood of 
achieving policy goals for either agricultural development 
or climate change. Important challenges thus remain in 
integration of policy goals across the two areas that work 
in synergy rather than undermine each other.
1 Introduction1
The aim of this paper is to analyse the nature and 
implications of emerging policy debates on climate 
change and agriculture in Malawi. Recent years have seen 
a rapidly increasing interest in the challenges, but also 
opportunities, that climate change presents to the 
agricultural sector in Africa.
Malawi is ranked as one of the countries in the world 
most at risk from the effects of climate change (Makoka, 
2008; World Bank, 2010). Much of the vulnerability to 
climate change is related to the population’s reliance on 
rain-fed agriculture to support their livelihoods. An 
increasing body of research has focused on the challenges 
posed by climate change to the country, and the range 
of possible responses at national and local levels (Bei, et 
al., 2006; Mkwambisi, 2012). A number of pilot adaptation 
and mitigation activities are underway, such as weather 
index insurance schemes and reafforestation programmes 
for carbon sequestration (Makoka, 2008; Jumbe, et al., 
2008).
However, less is known about how this increasing 
interest may translate into actions and achievement of 
goals for agricultural development and responses to 
climate change. This matters because funding for climate 
change activities – mitigation as well as adaptation – 
could have major implications on the agricultural sector 
in Malawi over the coming years and decades. For 
example, there are concerns that programmes focusing 
on carbon storage may undermine the ability of 
smallholder farmers to adapt to future climate change 
(Magombo, et.al., 2011). Chinsinga et al (2011) also 
suggest that there are conflicts between policy goals on 
climate change adaptation, focusing on crop 
diversification, and the strong support to maize in 
agricultural policies and the government’s flagship 
fertiliser subsidy programme.
This paper focuses on how debates on climate change 
and agriculture are taking place at the national level, and 
in turn their implications for the country’s agricultural 
development. What are the major narratives driving the 
debate, who are supporting (and opposing these), and 
why? Ultimately, what do they tell us about future 
pathways? A better understanding of these debates may 
help identify coherent policy goals and strategies, in 
Malawi as well as other countries in Africa.
To help unpack policy processes and address these 
questions, the paper builds on the analytical framework 
developed by Keeley and Scoones (2003). The framework 
highlights the dynamic interaction between three 
elements: narratives and discourses, actors and networks, 
and politics and interests. Of particular interest here is 
how policies, strategies and activities are shaped by how 
the issue is framed, how actors are organised around 
these narratives, and in turn how they use these to 
promote certain activities. The underlying hypothesis is 
that as climate change funding will be entering complex 
domestic policy processes, understanding the key 
narratives, actors and their interests can give important 
insights to why certain interventions are chosen over 
others, who may win or lose, and ultimately the conditions 
for achieving climate change policy goals amidst other 
priorities.
The paper is structured around the following sections. 
After a background on the Malawian national climate 
change and policy context (section 2), the paper then 
(section 3) explores the key narratives on agriculture and 
climate change, and elaborates on the politics of these 
in Malawi. In section 4, the paper looks at how these 
narratives are mobilised in activities on the ground, and 
some of the challenges this raises. The final part (Section 
5) offer some discussion and conclusions in relation to 
policy processes literature, discussing the future 
implications for Malawi.
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The study is part of a series of country case studies2 
which aims to unpack policy processes on climate change 
and agriculture. The paper is based on key informant 
interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and extensive 
review of secondary sources. Interviews were carried out 
during August-December 2011 with key informants 
among government agricultural sector staff, academics, 
representatives from donors and NGOs, and private 
sector representatives. A total of 35 and 6 key informant 
interviews and FGDs respectively were carried out for 
this assessment. The FGDs were carried out where more 
than three people from an organization were available 
for interviews. Secondary data sources included NGO 
reports, government policy and strategy documents, and 
donor agency reports. The assessment adopted entirely 
a qualitative approach due to the nature of the issues 
that were targeted. The qualitative approach focuses on 
perceptions, reactions and opinions of stakeholders 
rather than quantification in the collection and analysis 
of data (Bryman, 2001 and Campbell, 2002). This yields 
opinions and sentiments that are of greater value when 
analyzing policy, institutional and development issues.
2 Climate change and 
agriculture in Malawi: 
policy context
Malawi is ranked as one of the world’s twelve most 
vulnerable countries to the adverse effects of climate 
change (World Bank 2010). The country has been 
suffering from several floods and droughts over recent 
years. The adverse effects of climate change and 
variability in Malawi are skewed disproportionately 
towards agriculture: Malawian subsistence farmers suffer 
from climate related stressors in different ways through 
droughts, dry spells and floods, erratic and unreliable 
rainfalls.
The climate sensitivity of the agricultural sector is 
illustrated by the fact that almost 90 percent of Malawians 
depend on rain-fed subsistence agriculture for food. 
Malawi remains predominantly agrarian almost five 
decades after independence in July 1964 (Chirwa, 2004; 
Chinsinga, 2008; Anderson, 2011). The sector contributes 
over 90 percent to the country’s export earnings, about 
39 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), accounts for 85 percent of total employment, 
supplies more than 65 percent of the manufacturing 
sector’s raw materials, and provides 64 percent of the 
total income of the rural people (Mucavele, 2010).
As part of its colonial heritage, Malawi maintains a 
largely dualistic agricultural sector comprising the 
smallholder and estate sub-sectors (Chirwa, 2004; 
Chinsinga, 2008). It should be noted, however, that the 
smallholder sector is more important than the estate 
sector in terms of the overall contribution to total GDP. 
It is estimated that the smallholder sector accounts for 
80 percent of Malawi’s food production and 65 percent 
of agriculture’s contribution to the country’s GDP (GoM, 
2006).
Maize is the dominant crop for smallholder farmers 
in Malawi. Overall, an estimated 97 percent of smallholder 
farmers grow maize, and more than half of households 
grow no other crop (Vandermoortele and Bird, undated). 
According to Dorward et. al., (2008), the share of maize 
growers to the total varies from 93 to 99 percent in the 
country’s main regions. The paradox is that even though 
maize is a dominant crop among smallholder farmers in 
Malawi, only 10 percent of the maize growers are net 
sellers, with as high as 60 percent being net buyers 
(Anderson, 2011). This shows that while agriculture and 
maize are critically important to the livelihoods of most 
Malawians, their overall performance raises serious 
concerns about their long-term viability.
Malawi’s vulnerability to climate change is further 
heightened by the country’s high poverty levels. 
Although official figures show that the country has 
registered a rapid decrease in the incidence of poverty, 
declining from 53 percent to 39 percent between 2004 
and 2009, poverty remains deep, widespread and severe. 
Moreover, the official statistics that showcase the 
dramatic decline poverty are highly contested (Chinsinga, 
2010; Anderson, 2011). Poverty is predominantly rural 
with about 94 percent of the poor living in rural areas. 
According to Population Action International (2010), 
Malawi is one of the world’s most water stressed and 
least climate resilient countries, facing considerable 
challenges of declining agricultural production as well 
as rapid population growth rates.
Data from the 2005 Integrated Household Survey (IHS) 
clearly underscores Malawi’s vulnerability to the adverse 
effects of climate change in the agricultural sector 
(Makoka, 2008). The IHS showed that five out of the eight 
most serious shocks that households grapple with are 
agricultural in nature. These shocks, in order of severity, 
include large rises in food prices, lower crop yield due 
to drought or floods, large falls in crop sales, death or 
theft of livestock, and crop diseases or pests. According 
to Mkwambisi (undated), the situation is exacerbated by 
increasing poverty in rural areas, increasing population 
pressures on a limited land resource base, land 
degradation arising from agricultural expansion and the 
cultivation of marginal lands, and increasing deforestation 
to meet increasing demands for energy, food and 
construction purposes. Farmers’ vulnerability to climate 
change is further compounded by rapidly declining soil 
fertility, inadequate agricultural policies and the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic (Suarez and Linnerrooth-Bayer, 2010).
The Malawian government signed the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
on June 10 1992 and ratified it on April 21 1994. It acceded 
to the Kyoto Protocol in 20013 (Benson and Mangani, 
2009). The Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) 
is designated as the national focal point for the UNFCCC. 
Malawi has completed and submitted a number of 
reports to the Convention, including Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories, National Communications and the National 
Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) (Mkwambisi, 
undated).
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Malawi does not yet have a coherent national policy 
framework on climate change. The NAPA remains the 
key climate change policy document. Formulated in 
2006, the NAPA identifies thirty priority interventions for 
adaptation across eight different sectors, among them 
agriculture. Out of the thirty three priority areas, fifteen 
are considered as urgent in order to reduce the 
vulnerability of rural communities to adapt to the adverse 
impacts of extreme weather events caused by climate 
change (GoM, 2006). These pressing priorities are meant 
to strengthen the resilience of local communities to adapt 
to the adverse effects of climate change. The priority areas 
cover a wide range of issues whose strategic mix has the 
potential to strengthen the capacity of communities to 
adapt to the adverse effects of climate change (see also 
Box 1 below).
In the agricultural sector, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Water Development (MoAIRWD) has 
attempted to operationalise NAPA priorities through the 
Agriculture Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp). The ASWAp 
has been developed with support from a consortium of 
donors led by the World Bank. The ASWAp is basically a 
prioritised results orientated framework for implementing 
the agricultural components of the MGDS (Malawi 
Growth and Development Strategy), and aims to achieve 
harmonized and gradually aligned investments by 
government and donors. ASWAp’s main priorities are, 
(1) improved food security at household and national 
levels, (2) commercial agriculture, agro-processing and 
market development, (3) sustainable agricultural land 
and water management, (4) climate change issues, and 
(5) key support services, namely institutional 
development, capacity building and agricultural research 
and extension services.
The ASWAp identifies several strategies which are 
meant to increase the resilience of communities in rural 
areas to the adverse effects of climate change (GoM, 
2008). They include the following:
•	 Improvement	of	early	warning	systems						and	
weather insurance.
•	 Developing	community	storage	systems	for	seed	
and food.
•	 Increased	use	of	irrigation.
•	 Protection	of	catchment	areas.
•	 Developing	and	implementing	strategies	for	
drought preparedness and developing small 
dams to harvest water.
•	 Use	of	recommended	improved	crop	varieties	
that are resistant to drought.
•	 Use	of	recommended	improved	livestock	breeds.
•	 Improved	knowledge	and	understanding	on	
how low temperature profiles in the lake disrupt 
fish breeding and survival.
The ASWAp also promotes sustainable land and water 
management. This is considered vital for sustainable 
agricultural production for ensuring food security and 
agricultural incomes for the present and future 
generations. In particular, the overall objective is to 
promote conservation agriculture, seen as beneficial in 
order to increase the soil, water and nutrient capacity to 
ensure higher productivity of rain-fed crops and mitigate 
the effects of weather variability and climate change.
There is a long list of government policies that have 
a bearing on climate change and agriculture policy 
processes (see Annex 3). Broadly speaking, these are a 
combination of overarching national and sector specific 
policies. The overarching policies include the Vision 2020 
and the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy. 
These policies provide the broad strategic directions for 
sector specific policies in terms of what to prioritize when 
it comes to implementation. In many ways therefore, the 
sector specific policies operationalise the overarching 
national policy frameworks. Although different in tone 
and principal focus areas, the overall objective of both 
the overarching national and sector specific policies is 
to enhance the capacity of communities and local level 
institutions to adapt to the adverse effects of climate 
change.
Box 1: NAPA Priority Areas for Rural Areas
•Sustaining	life	and	livelihoods	for	the	most	vulnerable
•	Enhancing	food	security	and	developing	community	based	
storage systems for seed and food
•	Improving	crop	production	through	the	use	of	appropriate	
technologies
•	Increasing	resilience	of	food	production	systems	to	erratic	
rains by promoting sustainable dimba production of maize 
and vegetables in dambos, wetlands, along river valleys
•		Targeting	afforestration	and	reafforestation	programmes	
to control siltation and the provision of fuel wood and for 
their benefits, such as sources of alternative cash income
•	Improving	energy	access	and	security	in	rural	areas	(e.g.	
through extension of the rural electrification programme, 
energy-efficient stoves and development of ethanol-based 
stoves
•	 Improving	nutrition	among	 rural	 communities	 (e.g.	
through the promotion of fish farming, rearing of small 
ruminants and nutritional supplements for children and 
the sick
•	Disseminating	bed	nets	in	high	incidence	malaria	areas
•Developing	 food	 and	 water	 reserves	 for	 disaster	
preparedness and response 
•	Developing	community	based	wildlife	ranching	and	a	
breeding for Nyala
•	Developing	and	implementing	strategies	for	drought	
preparedness, food zoning, and mitigation works,
•	Developing	technologies	to	mitigate	climate	change	
•	Providing	standby	power	generation	facilities
•	Managing	forest	fires	in	collaboration	with	communities,	
and 
•	Developing	small	dams,	and	other	storage	facilities,	to	
mitigating flooding, to harvest water and to initiate 
community based fish farming and breeding
Source: Malawi NAPA (GoM, 2006)
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3 Key narratives and 
positioning of key actors
Few would disagree that climate change presents a 
challenge of increasing shocks and stressors to farming 
systems in Malawi that are already under pressure from 
a number of socio-economic stressors. However, the way 
this story is told differ in the description of causes, 
consequences and solutions. Two major overlapping, but 
also partly conflicting, narratives will be discussed in the 
rest of this section: first, the challenge of “climate 
proofing” the agricultural sector, and second, agriculture 
as part of a broader development agenda. As shown, 
these different narratives are supported by actors with 
particular takes on the problem, which in turn has 
implications for what actions may be advocated – and 
funded – in practice. 
3.1 The challenge of making 
agriculture “climate proof”
This narrative focuses on problems and solutions 
within the agricultural sector. Broadly, climate change is 
considered a challenge that can be managed while still 
relying on agriculture to provide livelihoods for the 
majority of the population. However, agricultural 
practices need to be adjusted, as current farming 
practices will be unable to tackle the challenges posed 
by climate change. This broad narrative is supported by 
a wide range of CSOs, donors, government agencies and 
researchers. However, there are alternative views on 
causes and solutions. Some view current farming 
practices as inherently unsustainable and leading to 
depleting soil fertility and reduced farm yields. In this 
view, the solution is to improve farming systems, 
introducing drought resistant crop varieties and 
emphasising the need for changes in farming practices 
and technologies. This view is illustrated by the argument 
from an interviewee that “farmers can only adapt to the 
adverse effects of climate change and guarantee 
themselves secure and resilient livelihoods if they 
dramatically modify their farming techniques”4. 
A sub-narrative here focuses on the need to reduce 
climate risks brought by climate change: Farmers can 
survive the adverse effects of climate change “if they 
would hedge against agricultural production risks such 
as droughts or floods”5. The weather index insurance is 
considered a critical component of farmers’ adaptation 
efforts because “weather shocks to agricultural income 
generate fluctuations in household consumption which 
in extreme cases may lead to famine or death”6. One key 
argument in its favour is that it can break down constraints 
that have locked Malawi in a so-called “low maize 
productivity trap” (LMPT) (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011). 
Being a maize dominant agricultural system, Dorward 
and Chirwa (2011) argue that inter-year maize price 
instabilities makes it less attractive for potential surplus 
maize producers to invest in productivity enhancing 
inputs such as improved seed and fertilizers, while it 
forces the poor to continue cultivating maize even when 
they cannot afford productivity enhancing inputs. They 
are forced to cultivate maize for fear of high maize prices. 
This is a cause of concern because the majority of maize 
producers, about 60 percent, are net buyers of the very 
same maize.
An alternative view to this narrative is that Malawian 
farming strategies are well adapted to climatic shocks 
and stressors, but that problems rather lie with the 
neglect of traditional knowledge and practices. In this 
view, improved crop varieties will only work if they fit 
the local social and cultural context and address other 
underlying constraints to farming such as land and 
market access. The promotion of conservation agriculture 
(see below) borrows from both these views in that it 
involves a change from traditional farming practices, but 
also focus on low external technology inputs. 
Internationally, conservation agriculture is promoted as 
“climate smart agriculture”, i.e. a practices that can help 
productivity increases while addressing both mitigation 
and adaptation7. 
3.2 Agriculture as part of the 
broader development 
agenda
A second major narrative shares the view that farming 
needs to be modernised, but has a broader focus. 
Agriculture is seen as an engine for economic growth, 
but also an option that with climate change may become 
increasingly unviable for many of those currently relying 
on agriculture for their livelihoods. Movement out of 
agriculture thus forms part of the solution. The main 
argument is that “climate change is not merely an 
agricultural problem but rather a development problem 
[and] hence the agricultural sector should not be treated 
separately when dealing with it”8. This narrative is mainly 
advocated by some donors and government officials, 
mostly from the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning 
and Development (MoFE&D). The recommendation is 
that climate change issues have to be mainstreamed9 
into the country’s development programmes and 
priorities aimed at achieving sustainable development.
Following from this, the argument is that climate 
change has to be treated as a crosscutting issue, as 
climate change affects almost each and every aspect of 
people’s livelihoods, and thus “we need to think about 
climate change and its implications for development in 
everything we do”10 According to an official from the 
MoFEP&D, climate change issues have to be mainstreamed 
in the country’s overarching development frameworks 
such as the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 
(MGDS). The interviewee argued that it was on this 
premise that “climate change issues have already been 
mainstreamed in the draft MGDS II”11. This is imperative 
because climate change presents a serious and 
multifaceted development challenge.
The NAPA illustrates this perspective. According to 
one view,12 the distinctive feature of the NAPA is that it 
is “clear in suggesting that other than restricting climate 
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change to the traditional categorization of it being an 
environmental issue, the framework adopts a broader 
view” . The NAPA postulates that climate change entails 
the broader developmental concept that relates to the 
desire for poverty reduction, to attain food security, and 
sustainable socio-economic development for the 
medium and long-term. This represents a departure from 
how climate change issues were conceptualized in the 
MDGS I, where the framing of climate change was greatly 
orientated toward the agricultural sector. The intended 
outcomes in addressing matters of climate were to 
achieve resilience to the adverse effects; improved 
agricultural production under changing climatic 
conditions; and improved climate monitoring and 
preparedness to disasters (GoM, 2006).
While advocates of this narrative acknowledge that 
the dominance of the agricultural sector in the country 
makes it attractive to pay special attention to it, they 
argue this “completely misses out the point that climate 
change is a development problem and not necessarily 
an agricultural problem per se”13. The main thrust of this 
narrative is that climate change is best addressed as part 
of an integrated sustainable development agenda that 
promotes economic growth, advances energy security, 
reduces pollution and eradicates poverty, as well as 
mitigates greenhouse gas emissions. The overriding goal 
is to achieve sustainable development which can reduce 
vulnerability to climate change by enhancing a country’s 
adaptive capacity and increasing its resilience (Dovers 
and Hezri, 2010).
A further aspect of this narrative is that treating climate 
change challenges in the agricultural sector as an integral 
part of the sustainable development agenda broadens 
prospects for diversification of livelihoods out of 
agriculture. One interviewee argued that “the emphasis 
on the agricultural sector limits consideration of options 
that can make individuals, communities or even countries 
resilient to the adverse effects of climate change”14. The 
sustainable development perspective would thus foster 
initiatives and interventions that would help vulnerable 
communities to step out of agriculture as their principal 
source of livelihood. It was further argued that “the 
narrow focus on the agricultural sector is taking a huge 
gamble especially as climatic patterns continue to get 
even more precarious that may greatly undermine 
agriculture as a viable livelihood strategy”15. The bottom 
line is thus that there is need to promote livelihood 
diversification as climatic patterns become more and 
more uncertain.
As a counter narrative, many CSO representatives 
contended that advocacy for climate change as a 
development challenge, especially from donors, is “a 
veiled attempt to promote mitigation measures to deal 
with the problem of climate change”16. They particularly 
singled out carbon sequestration initiatives as enhancing 
rather than reducing the vulnerability of farmers to the 
adverse effects of climate. The argument was that donors 
are “shifting the burden of addressing the adverse effects 
of climate change to the poor and vulnerable segments 
of society in developing countries like Malawi”17. Carbon 
sequestration initiatives have “introduced considerable 
competition between land for cultivation of food crops 
and trees”18. This is construed as a serious threat to food 
security since carbon sequestration initiatives have 
enormous substitutive effect as a result of the financial 
incentives associated with them. Consequently, threats 
to food security loom large because farmers are releasing 
portions of their already little land endowments for 
growing trees for carbon sequestration. Thus, for critics, 
construing climate in the agricultural sector as an integral 
part of the sustainable development agenda exposes 
them to a risk not only of increased competition, but it 
also “masks the fact that farmers have to shoulder a 
disproportionate burden of implementing strategies to 
deal with the problem of climate change at expense of 
their own food security”19.
4 Policies, actors and 
politics
Although the two main narratives above are not 
mutually exclusive, they illustrate some of the challenges 
and choices facing the agricultural sector in Malawi under 
climate change. To understand their implications, it is 
necessary to consider them in relation to the politics of 
the agricultural sector in Malawi. The nature of climate 
change and agricultural policy processes is greatly 
affected by the jostling at the national level about which 
government agency should coordinate climate change 
issues. The intense struggle among government agencies 
is attributed to “the desire to control real or imagined 
massive financial resource flows associated with the 
climate change agenda”20. Importantly, this struggle for 
control of the climate change agenda seems to have 
somewhat obscured the role of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Water Development (MoAI&WD), despite 
the fact that adverse effects of climate change in Malawi 
will be disproportionately felt in the agricultural sector.
There is clearly a battle of leadership control for the 
climate change agenda both generally and specifically 
in the agricultural sector. There are three government 
agencies which different stakeholders feel are better 
placed to provide leadership to the climate change 
agenda (Chinsinga, et al., 2011). Currently designated as 
the focal point for climate change activities in the public 
sector, the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) 
is touted as an ideal leader because “it has the required 
capacity and technical knowhow on broad and specific 
climate change issues”21. On the other hand, those 
viewing climate change challenge as a development 
issue are pushing for the Ministry of Finance, Economic 
Planning and Development (MoFEP&D) to assume a 
leadership role in the sector, because “of the crosscutting 
nature of climate change issues which makes climate 
change both an economic and development issue”22. 
Still others are of the view that the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Water Development (MoAI&WD) is better 
positioned to do so because the adverse effects of climate 
change in this country are predominantly agricultural in 
nature (Makoka, 2008): “climate change effects affect 
agriculture most than any other sector since Malawi is 
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predominantly agrarian which generally threatens 
people’s livelihoods and the economy as a whole”23. Out 
of the eight serious shocks identified by Makoka (2008) 
that Malawi grapples with, five are agricultural in nature.
Many attribute the struggle for leadership to the 
absence of a coherent climate change policy framework. 
Although there is a national climate change programme, 
this does not resolve the question of leadership of the 
climate change agenda. The argument is that “without 
a policy framework outlining the scope and nature of 
the climate change problem in the country, the question 
of leadership in the sector is bound to be contested”24. 
The national climate change programme is essentially a 
framework for implementing climate change projects, 
coordinated by UNDP. It was an initiative of donors to 
provide some strategic direction in the implementation 
of climate change activities in the country.
At the same time, the three potential lead agencies 
have engaged with the national climate change 
programme in ways that could strategically bolster their 
claims of leadership. There is some merit in each of the 
positions, but also concerns that “in the final analysis, 
each of these three groups of stakeholders are intent on 
promoting their own interests to attain their selfish 
goals”25. One of the factors fuelling an intense struggle 
for leadership of the sector is the perception that there 
are massive financial resources attached to the climate 
change agenda. This could also partly explain the strong 
resistance among public sector agencies to develop a 
distinct climate change policy. The use of their sectoral 
policies provides them with bargaining leverage in trying 
to assert and promote their own interests, couched in 
narratives they believe strongly conveys them. In the 
current institutional set up, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Water Development (MoA&WD) is not as 
prominent as the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning 
and Development (MoFEP&D) and the Department of 
Environmental Affairs (DEA). In the donor-government 
working group, MoFEP&D is the chair while DEA is the 
secretariat, while MoAI&WD is just an ordinary member.
The politics in the sector is further underlined by the 
competing policy discourses identified earlier. The 
framing of the overarching national strategies is skewed 
in favour of treating climate change as a development 
challenge, while the majority of those in the agricultural 
sector favour promotion of solutions within the 
agricultural sector. Both the Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy (MGDS) and the National 
Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) frame the 
climate challenge as an integral part of the sustainable 
development agenda, although most of the strategies 
proposed are predominantly agricultural sector oriented. 
Through its own sector specific initiatives, for the 
instance, the Agricultural Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp), 
the MoAI&WD promotes the implementation of 
interventions inspired by the ideals of climate smart 
agriculture as the best way to deal with the adverse 
effects of climate change in a predominantly agrarian 
society. The ASWAp has, for instance, attracted a pool of 
resources from a consortium of donors, but its 
implementation does not seem to reflect commitment 
to the ideals of climate smart agriculture.
Funding for climate change activities in the agricultural 
sector is equally political. Many perceive funding as 
ad-hoc and not guided by transparent and accountable 
principles (Wolstenholme and Ng’ambi, 2010). Funding 
to the sector at aggregate nominal levels has increased 
in the last four years, but actual shares of the overall 
budgets have declined. This fact does not reflect the 
designation of managing climate change, natural 
resources and environment as a priority in the MGDS II. 
The paradox is that while the Department of 
Environmental Affairs (DEA) is the focal point of climate 
change activities, its level of funding is quite low to enable 
it to adequately fulfil this particular role. The funding to 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water 
Development (MoAI&WD) has progressively improved, 
but the lion’s share is taken up by the Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme (FISP) at the expense of initiatives that would 
enhance communities’ resilience to the adverse effects 
of climate change in the sector, all because of the primacy 
of the politics of food security in the country (Chinsinga, 
2010).
Implementation of the FISP has dominated the 
agricultural sector in Malawi since its introduction in the 
2005/06 growing season. The apparent increase in the 
budgetary allocations to agriculture is almost entirely 
taken up by the FISP. Although the design of the FISP 
has the potential to promote climate change adaptation 
and mitigation through the ASWAp (in which climate 
change is an integral part of initiatives meant to improve 
food security and risk management), the actual 
implementation of the FISP does not fully pay attention 
to critical aspects that would have enhanced linkages 
between the understanding of the effects of climate 
change in the agricultural sector (Dorward, et al., 2008). 
This is attributed principally to the enormous political 
traction of FISP within the framework of the country’s 
political economy: The legitimacy of the Malawian 
government is intimately linked to food security (Sahely, 
et al., 2005). The preoccupation of any government is, 
therefore, to achieve food security at any cost, in which 
other goals become secondary. The success of the 
agricultural sector is measured mainly on the basis of its 
ability to ensure food self-sufficiency, and how this 
success is achieved play second fiddle.
The politics of funding is further manifest in the 
enormous disparities between resources at the central 
and local government levels. The concentration of 
resources at the centre is difficult to justify in relation to 
adaptation goals, since critical adaptation activities 
within the NAPA framework would take place at the local 
level where vulnerability to climate change is the highest. 
This can be seen to reflect, to a very great extent, the 
politics of NAPAs as an externally driven initiative, even 
though it is meant to – and presented as – highlighting 
domestic priority areas for adaptation interventions.
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The government is seen to have a stronger role in the 
actual implementation of activities on the ground. 
Obviously, donors have stronger influence on project 
based expenditures “which are often meant to address 
priority issues from their perspectives” 26 than for 
resources coming out of national budgets. Donors 
dominate the design of the projects since “they control 
and fund the generation of credible knowledge that 
informs the priorities to be addressed”27. The situation 
is different when it comes to resources from the national 
budget. Instead of directing funding to where action 
toward adaptation is supposed to take place, the 
resources are concentrated at the centre, which is 
contrary to the underlying logic of the NAPA framework. 
As demonstrated in Annex 4, the level of funding to local 
governments shows that national level governments play 
a critical role in framing the general policy environment 
in which decisions critical to adaptation such as public 
expenditure, land use, and allocation of water resources 
are made (Chinsinga, et al., 2011).
5 Convergence or 
divergence? Implications 
for activities on the 
ground
The following section explores how two narratives 
identified in this paper play out in four different types of 
activities on climate change and agriculture that are 
being promoted – and funded – at present in Malawi: 
conservation agriculture, drought resistant varieties, 
agroforestry and tree crops, and weather-based 
insurance, as well as how they are critiqued.
5.1 Conservation agriculture
Conservation agriculture is described as a way of 
managing agro-ecosystems to achieve higher, sustained 
productivity, increased profits and food security while 
enhancing the environment (Mkwambisi, 2012). Three 
key principles underpin conservation agriculture, 
namely: minimum soil disturbance, permanent soil cover 
and diversified crop associations and rotations. Primary 
strategies for conservation agriculture highlighted by 
stakeholders include the following: 1) changing farming 
practices; 2) modifying crop type and varieties; 3) natural 
resource management and crop diversification; 4) 
intercropping, reforestation, micro-irrigation; and 5) 
water harvesting.
Conservation agriculture is highly contested although 
it is firmly on the agenda in the climate mitigation and 
adaptation policy realms. According to Milder et al. 
(2011), conservation agriculture offers the promise of 
locally adapted, low external input agricultural strategy 
that can be adopted by the poorest and most vulnerable 
farming communities. For this reason, some stakeholders 
observed that conservation agriculture “works for women 
and people with HIV and AIDS because it requires low 
labour inputs yet it has huge potential of restoring soil 
health”28. Conservation agriculture was further justified 
as “the only promising sustainable key to tackling hunger 
in the country”29, and as sustainable because it improves 
soil fertility while reducing erosion and labour. 
Conservation agriculture techniques were described as 
“the simplest and cheapest, but they are ignored because 
they are not of interest to the private sector which is 
driven almost entirely by the desire to make profits”30. 
The overall argument is thus that conservation agriculture 
should be promoted because long-term fertilizer use is 
not only too expensive, but also degrades the environment 
in particular by releasing the greenhouse gas nitrous 
oxide.
Critics argue that conservation agriculture does not 
produce benefits for climate change mitigation in terms 
of greenhouse gas emissions or carbon sequestration, 
nor does it help conservation of biodiversity and 
ecosystems. It is not attractive because “benefits are not 
immediate yet farmers are anxious to enhance 
productivity to satisfy their food requirements”31. 
According to one respondent, the full scale promotion 
of conservation agriculture is also constrained by “some 
evidence which suggest that conservation agriculture 
can actually decrease yields”32. This debate has created 
divisions even within the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation 
and Water Development to the extent that some argue 
that “large doses of inorganic fertilizers are the most 
practical solution to the challenging problem of food 
security in Malawi”33. There are still others who adopt a 
middle of the road perspective, but on balance privileging 
inorganic fertilizers. They argue that “conservation 
agriculture has a part to play in maintaining soil fertility 
for climate change adaptation, but they cannot replace 
inorganic fertilizers”34.
Milder et al., (2011) argue that conservation agriculture 
is difficult to promote in contexts of subsidies and related 
policies to agriculture. This was reflected by one informant 
arguing that “conservation agriculture is a non-starter in 
Malawi since farmers have been made to believe that 
the solution to poor yields is fertilizer use”35. Perhaps 
partly for that reason, it is difficult for conservation 
agriculture to gain political traction in Malawi. Subsidies 
have proven to be the solution to the twin problems of 
hunger and pervasive food insecurity. Arguably, they 
have become an integral part of the social contract 
between the state and the citizens, and there is, so to 
speak, a political and economic bind of subsidies in 
Malawi. It was therefore argued that conservation 
agriculture cannot take off on a bigger scale and that 
farmers can only adopt conservation agriculture when 
fertilizers become unaffordable. There are thus no strong 
incentives for farmers to adopt conservation agriculture, 
since “they know they have access to cheaper fertilizer 
through the subsidy programme”36.
The adoption of conservation agriculture is further 
constrained by existing land tenure arrangements. The 
majority of farmers cultivate on customary land which 
remains insecure due to stalled land reforms (Chinsinga, 
2011). Since conservation agriculture requires 
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considerable investments to promote soil fertility and 
ecosystem management, “this may not be possible 
because of the insecurity of the customary land tenure 
system”37. Female farmers are said to be particularly 
constrained as “their right to vital resources such as land 
is subject to male permission” 38.
5.2 Drought resistant seed 
varieties
There is debate around the types of seeds used to 
support climate change adaptation. The government, 
along with development agencies such as FAO, DFID, 
USAID and NORAD, argue that farmers should switch to 
improved seed varieties which are “high yielding and 
resistant to drought, diseases and pests”39. The argument 
is that the attributes of hybrid seeds make them ideal 
for purposes of cushioning farmers against the adverse 
effects of climate change. According to one of the 
respondents, “drought resistant varieties are the best 
hope for dealing with the adverse effects of climate 
change”40. 
The contrasting positions underlie particular interests 
that different stakeholders are determined to defend, 
protect and promote. According to most NGO officials 
and local researchers, the promotion of hybrid seed 
varieties is primarily meant “to promote the foreign seed 
industry since most of the donors support the subsidy 
programme through the seed component”. The use of 
hybrid seeds is further promoted by donors with the 
strong ideological conviction that the agricultural sector 
can be strongly revamped if the private sector plays a 
dominant role. Thus through supporting the subsidy seed 
component, there is great opportunity to entrench the 
role of the private sector through input supply chain 
systems especially in the agro-dealer network. The 
government is strongly promoting the use of hybrid seed 
varieties. The use of hybrid seeds is advantageous to the 
government since high yields would bolster food security 
which is a key concern for any administration in the 
country. 
This is challenged by most local NGOs and local 
researchers who argue that “local seed varieties are 
agronomically suitable to local conditions, disease and 
pest resistant to enable farmers to adapt to the adverse 
effects of climate”41 Some go further, arguing that “the 
dominance of maize on the country’s political agenda 
has ensured that the subsidy programme fails to promote 
crop diversification which is one of the critical elements 
of conservation agriculture”42. According to most NGO 
officials and local researchers, the promotion of hybrid 
seed varieties is primarily meant “to promote the foreign 
seed industry, since most of the donors support the 
subsidy programme through the seed component”. Some 
also argued that donors pushing for the prominence of 
the private in the agricultural sector “have close 
connections with companies that supply the bulk of seed 
to the subsidy programme”43.
5.3 Agroforestry and tree crops
There is a renewed interest in agro-forestry and tree 
crops as it is seen as one way of sequestering carbon and 
combating global warming (Gladwin et al., 2011). As 
noted by one donor representative, “smallholder tree 
production can make a significant contribution to 
improving rural livelihoods and strengthening national 
economies, yet it is often ignored by policy makers and 
politicians”44. Agro-forestry is seen as an ideal strategy 
for climate change adaptation and mitigation because 
it could increase farmers’ income and sequester carbon. 
It is regarded as “a good way of creating stable carbon 
stocks”45.
The adoption of agro-forestry and tree crops has been 
somewhat slow because farmers do not see their benefits. 
According to one of the respondents, farmers’ reluctance 
is due to the fact that “fertilizer trees take between 6-10 
years before they are ready to fertilize crops, yet farmers 
have to survive”46. Just as in the case of conservation 
agriculture, farmers may find agro-forestry and tree crops 
less attractive since “they see inorganic fertilizers as the 
key to growing more food”47. In defence of agro-forestry, 
its advocates argue that “they are a long-term sustainable 
measure to arrest further soil fertility decline and increase 
it since artificial fertilizers increase yields temporarily and 
eventually leaves the soil almost completely infertile”48.
Most of the CSOs contended that advocacy for climate 
change as a development challenge especially among 
donors is “a veiled attempt to promote mitigation 
measures to deal with the problem of climate change”49. 
They particularly singled out carbon sequestration 
initiatives as actually enhancing rather than reducing 
the vulnerability of farmers to the adverse effects of 
climate. Through these initiatives, it was argued that 
donors are “shifting the burden of addressing the adverse 
effects of climate change to the poor and vulnerable 
segments of society in developing countries like 
Malawi”50.
Carbon sequestration initiatives have “introduced 
considerable competition between land for cultivation 
of food crops and trees”51. This is construed as a serious 
threat to the food security of the people since carbon 
sequestration initiatives have enormous substitutive 
effect as a result of the financial incentives associated 
with them. Consequently, threats to food security loom 
large because farmers are releasing positions of their 
already little land endowments for growing trees for 
carbon sequestration. For the critics of this narrative, 
construing climate in the agricultural sector as an integral 
part of the sustainable development agenda “masks the 
fact that farmers have to shoulder a disproportionate 
burden of implementing strategies to deal with the 
problem of climate change at expense of their own food 
security”52.
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5.4 Weather Index Insurance as 
“the Magic Wand”
There is increasing focus on weather indexed insurance 
as an opportunity for farmers to surmount the so-called 
low maize productivity trap (LMPT). Some argue that a 
low maize productivity trap is inevitable in a situation 
where “the major constraint to agricultural investment 
in rural Malawi is lack of affordable credit for smallholder 
farmers, and more generally the absence of functioning 
markets for financial services” (Suarez and Linnerroorth-
Bayer, 2010: 272). Moreover, banks are not willing to lend 
to smallholder farmers “primarily because of the risk that 
they would not pay back their loans if there were a 
drought”53. Consequently farmers continue to utilize low 
yield seed varieties that, even with good rains, are unlikely 
to provide yields high enough for them to escape poverty.
Following this argument, the weather indexed 
insurance “makes it possible for banks to extend loans 
to smallholders which they would not have otherwise 
been able to access”54. With such loans, farmers are 
therefore able “to purchase high quality seeds that would 
increase productivity and raise their standards of living”55. 
The argument therefore is that such farmers would be 
in a better position to adapt to the adverse effects of 
climate change by, among other things, diversifying the 
portfolio of their livelihoods (Syroka, 2007).
The weather index insurance can be done even at the 
level of a country. This would “enable a country to access 
funds quickly in the event of a severe and catastrophic 
drought, reduce dependence on humanitarian appeals”56. 
The Government of Malawi, with technical support from 
the World Bank, has for the last two years transferred a 
portion of the risk of severe drought to the international 
market using weather derivatives (World Bank, 2011a). 
This scheme works in such a way that “if a severe and 
catastrophic drought takes place, Malawi will receive 
funds from the weather derivatives within days”57. 
Malawi’s premium for the scheme was financed with 
support from the Department for International 
Development (DFID). According to World Bank (2011b), 
weather derivatives can help countries plan and 
implement proactive responses to natural disasters. 
These transactions can be customized according to each 
country’s specific needs based on the type of weather 
hazard, desired level of protection, and the estimated 
financial loss associated with a severe and catastrophic 
event. This would thus make donor agencies switch part 
of their post-disaster response to supporting more 
efficient pre-disaster instruments (Suarez and Linnerrroth-
Bayer, 2010).
While the proponents of this solution claim that 
weather indexed insurance schemes increase the credit 
worthiness of farmers and productivity which makes 
them less vulnerable to drought  and other related 
climate change impacts, critics brand them as “exploitative 
commercial ventures preying on the plight of the poor 
by a consortium of profit seeking establishments”58. They 
criticise the institutional arrangement for the weather 
indexed insurance schemes that have been piloted in 
Malawi as exploitative of the poor farmers. This is 
attributed to the fact that the premium and loan interests 
make up a significant proportion (about 10 percent) of 
farmers’ expected income. The argument is that “the 
consortium of these actors [involved in the insurance 
schemes] has packaged the climate change message in 
commercial wraps and farmers cannot see because they 
have been blinded with loans they get from banks”59.
There are also other concerns with the viability of the 
weather indexed insurance schemes. It is argued that 
weather index insurance is just part of the solution since 
enabling farmers to access loans for enhancing 
productivity raises questions of marketing and sale of 
the produce at profitable prices. If these questions are 
not addressed then “the expectations of the weather 
indexed insurance schemes cannot be fully realized”60. 
The success of weather indexed insurance schemes 
further depends on the existence of reliable weather 
infrastructure in the form of reliable, timely and high 
quality data weather station networks.
According to World Bank (2011b), such infrastructure 
is critical to ensure adherence to strict quality 
requirements, including trustworthy ongoing daily 
collection and reporting procedures, daily quality control 
and cleaning and an independent source of data 
verification. Many interviewees doubted whether 
weather infrastructure of such quality exists in Malawi, 
and raised concerns about the ability of most farmers to 
understand the operative dynamics of the weather 
indexed insurance in order for them to make informed 
decisions. For example, they felt that the technicalities 
involved are rather complex “to be fully grasped by 
farmers, most of whom have very low levels of literacy”61. 
This invariably raises questions about fairness, equity and 
justice.
6 Discussion and 
conclusions
The preceding sections have shown how climate 
change discussions intersect with agricultural policy 
debates in Malawi. Returning to the initial questions on 
framings of the problems, actors supporting those and 
how outcomes are shaped, several insights can be drawn.
The debate in Malawi closely mirrors international 
debates on agriculture and climate change. While the 
term “climate smart agriculture”, increasingly prevalent 
as a unifying term at the international level, does not 
(yet) frame the discussion in Malawi, discussions around 
technologies for risk management, the role of improved 
seeds, and carbon sequestration are all familiar elsewhere. 
Looking closer, however, debates and outcomes are also 
shaped by domestic issues and concerns. There is little 
doubt or disagreement among stakeholders in the 
agricultural sector about the need to take climate change 
seriously, with close to 90 percent of the population 
dependent on agriculture as their principal source of 
livelihood, and the fact that five of the eight most serious 
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shocks that Malawians grapple with are agricultural in 
nature (Makoka, 2008). 
The way problems and solutions differ between two 
dominant framings; one seeing it as an agricultural sector 
challenge, and another as a broader, development-
focused challenge. These relate to broader debates about 
the viability of agriculture as a livelihood in a changing 
climate. But as discussed above, they must also be seen 
in the context of the struggle for leadership on climate 
change and agriculture between the Department of 
Environmental Affairs (the current lead on climate change 
in Malawi), the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning 
and Development (MoFEP&D), both behind the 
“development” narrative, and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Water Development (MoAI&WD) 
supporting the “agriculture” narrative. Interestingly, 
differences between the two narratives become less 
obvious when looking at some of the most common 
interventions in the agricultural sector on the ground 
(section 5), which mostly focus on sector-specific 
interventions. This also indicates that the different 
narratives so far have more bearing at the national than 
local levels. What they do suggest, however, is the strong 
bearing of the subsidy programme on activities and 
outcomes, showing how FISP promote some of the 
interventions (improved, hybrid seeds) while partly in 
direct conflict with, partly undermining other strategies 
or goals (agroforestry, conservation agriculture, crop 
diversification).
There is little doubt about the major role of donors, 
described by one interviewee as “a strong but invisible 
hand”62. The role of donors is particularly important in 
explaining the focus on carbon sequestration, for which 
the domestic benefits are particularly contested, but 
which nevertheless feature strongly in activities on the 
ground. The importance of donors is due to at least two 
factors. First, donors dominate both funding for priorities 
to be implemented and the generation of knowledge 
that informs the definition of priorities. As demonstrated 
in the narratives and the practical implications associated 
with these narratives, there are attempts on the part of 
some NGOs and government agencies to provide 
alternative ways of thinking about the priority issues and 
interventions in the sector, but they have gained little 
traction because of lack of independent funding streams, 
and further reinforced by the perception that local actors 
cannot generate credible knowledge that accurately 
inform action in the sector. This was ascertained during 
the fieldwork when one of the donor agency officials 
observed that “we encourage them to take a driver’s seat 
and our role is that of facilitator and knowledge 
provider”63.
This does not, however, suggest that there is consensus 
among donors. They too push for different and sometimes 
conflicting priorities about what needs to be done in 
order to address the challenges of climate change in the 
agricultural sector. Overall, the point is that relative to 
the other actors identified in this study, donors tend to 
be dominant in the framing of narratives and prioritizing 
the courses of action to be undertaken. For example, 
there are some donors that are pushing for agro-forestry 
and conservation agriculture, while others are supporting 
the subsidy programme. Donors like NORAD, Irish Aid 
and FAO are supporting agro-forestry as well as the 
fertilizer subsidy programme. As shown above, the 
subsidy programme is considered one of the reasons for 
the slow uptake of agro-forestry programmes. Likewise, 
we have also argued that support to the subsidy 
programme undermine efforts to promote conservation 
agriculture. One reason for these seemingly conflicting 
strategies (even from the same donor agency) may be 
the wish to be part of the subsidy programme’s success 
story. Support to the subsidy programme can also be 
seen as an ideological commitment from some donors 
to promote involvement of the private sector in 
agricultural development.
Like government departments, most NGOs did not 
have significant room for manoeuvre in terms of framing 
dominant policy narratives as well as prioritizing courses 
of action to be taken. As seen above, some NGOs have 
attempted to confront dominant policy framings of 
donors by producing alternative narratives, courses of 
action and knowledge. For instance, NGOs have argued 
for the promotion of local seed varieties and conservation 
agriculture, and have argued against weather index 
insurance schemes as well as attempted to generate 
alternative knowledge to the mainstream. However, their 
efforts have (at least as yet) failed to significantly influence 
the policy framing and priorities for action. While 
government agencies have strongly pushed for 
adaptation, in line with the conviction that northern 
countries have to bear the costs for addressing the 
adverse effects of climate change in the sector, donors 
have dominated on how these schemes are designed 
and implemented.
There are important implications of these dynamics. 
Ultimately, the burden of the interventions falls on the 
shoulders of farmers. Through carbon sequestration 
schemes, there is a huge temptation among farmers to 
dedicate their already limited land to the exercise which 
threatens food security. As argued by one interviewee, 
“the way in which these schemes are designed shifts the 
burden of adjustment to farmers especially since there 
is very little commitment to capacitate farmers on how 
to account for the carbon trade which greatly diminishes 
the prospects of benefits”64. As illustrated in the foregoing 
paragraphs, donors dominate the framing of policy 
narratives as well as the exercise of defining priority issues 
in the sector.
There are numerous initiatives directed at dealing with 
the adverse effects of climate change mainly because of 
differing perspectives among donors. Arguably, the 
“room for manoeuvre” of key domestic actors are quite 
limited. Both government agencies and local NGOs are 
left with the choice of which donors’ perspectives to align 
themselves with as a way of accessing funding, knowledge 
and gaining legitimacy in the sector. This may help 
explain why there is a serious struggle for leadership of 
the climate change agenda in the public sector. Similarly, 
NGOs have taken on different positions depending on 
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who their source of funding is. However, in the final 
analysis the major donors are seen to dominate the policy 
perspectives and what gets done as a matter of priority 
in the sector. Although there are alternative framings 
about what needs to be done in the sector, the fertilizer 
subsidy programme still dominates despite increasing 
evidence of the negative effects on efforts to help 
Malawian agriculture adapt to climate change. The donor 
priorities determines who gets funded and on what 
exactly the funding is spent. Consequently government 
agencies and NGOs tailor their activities in line with the 
preferences of donors in the sector in order to access 
funding.
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Annexes
Annex 1: Key Actors in Climate 
Change and Agriculture 
Policy Processes
There are several actors that are active in the field of 
climate change and agriculture policy processes in 
Malawi. These actors can be distinguished into six main 
categories, namely: government agencies, development 
partners, civil society organizations, private sector, 
research institutions and the media. This annex focuses 
on how the different categories of actors involved with 
policy processes on climate change and agriculture, and 
their inter relationships.
Government Agencies
They are considered as the primary actor in the climate 
change and agriculture policy processes. The main 
agencies include the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation 
and Water Development (MoAI&WD), the Ministry of 
Natural Resources, Energy and Environment (MoNRE&E), 
the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and 
Development (MoFEP&D) and the Parliamentary 
Committee on Agriculture and Natural Resources 
(PCANR).
There is a strong perception among stakeholders that 
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development 
(MoAI&WD) should take a leading role in matters of 
climate change and agriculture policy processes. This is 
justified on the account that “climate change effects 
affect agriculture most than any other sector since Malawi 
is predominantly agrarian which generally threatens 
people’s livelihoods and the economy as a whole”65. There 
are, however, still others who feel climate change and 
agriculture policy processes should be coordinated by 
the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and 
Environment (MoNRE&E) because “it has the required 
capacity and technical knowhow on broad and specific 
climate change issues”66. A final group of stakeholders 
advocated for the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning 
and Development (MoFEP&D) to be designated as the 
coordinating body for climate change issues in the public 
sector, a responsibility that is currently entrusted to the 
Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Environment 
(MoNRE&E) through the Department of Environmental 
Affairs (DEA). MoFEP&D is touted as an ideal coordinating 
body because “of the crosscutting nature of climate 
change issues which makes climate change both an 
economic and development issue”67.
The nature of climate change and agricultural policy 
processes is greatly affected by the jostling at the national 
level about which government agency should coordinate 
climate change issues. The intense struggle among 
government agencies is attributed to “the desire to 
control real or imagined massive financial resource flows 
associated with the climate change agenda”68. The 
struggle for control of the climate change agenda has 
somewhat obscured the role of MoAI&WD yet the adverse 
effects of climate change are disproportionately felt in 
the agricultural sector.
The climate change discourses from the agricultural 
perspective are not accorded the prominence they 
deserve because the coordinating agency, the 
Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) “exercises 
discretion with regard to which perspectives to prioritize 
depending on several interacting variables: disciplinary 
orientations of the responsible officers; personal 
networks; and the currency of certain perspectives”69. 
For this reason, some sectoral policies have tended to 
dominate the climate change agenda than others since 
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“Malawi does not yet have a coherent policy framework 
on climate change”70. The absence of a coherent policy 
framework does not work in favour of climate change 
and agricultural policy processes. The argument is that 
such a policy framework would have invariably given 
climate change and agriculture policy processes 
prominence being a sector hardest hit by the adverse 
effects of climate change.
The apparent marginalization of the climate change 
and agricultural policy processes is further manifested 
in the existing institutional arrangement as described in 
Box 2 below. In this institutional framework, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development is not 
accorded any prominent role. It is treated just like any 
other ministry “yet Malawi’s prospects as a nation will 
depend on how it will adapt to the adverse effects of 
climate change in the agricultural sector”71.
The role of the Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture 
and Natural Resources (PCNAR) on climate change and 
agriculture policy processes was described as insignificant. 
This has, however, to be situated in a proper context. 
Since the transition to democracy in May 1994, 
parliamentary committees have not been strong. They 
have not been able to perform their functions fully due 
to inadequate or total lack of funding (Patel, et al., 2007). 
Parliamentary committees have become even more 
docile following the dominance of the governing party 
in the national legislature (Kanyongolo, 2010 and 
Chinsinga, 2010). They have more or less given up on 
their oversight role. This can be attributed to enduring 
legacy of the Malawi’s one party state political culture 
and the centralizing tendencies of the Executive branch 
of government (Cammack, 2010). This translates into “the 
belief that [Parliamentarians] must not be critical of the 
Executive Branch or its policies which greatly weakens 
our capacity and will to monitor central government 
policy implementation and to recommend reforms”72.
Development Agencies
There are several development partners that are 
actively engaged in climate change and agricultural 
policy processes. These include World Bank, United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), European 
Union (EU), Department for International Development 
(DFID), Norwegian Agency for International Development 
(NORAD), World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and Irish Aid among many others. The development 
partners have constituted themselves into a working 
group chaired by DFID. The main role of the working 
group is to promote strategic engagement with 
government and CSOs on matters of climate change.
As indicated earlier, development partners and 
government agencies further engage each other on 
matters of climate through a working group co-chaired 
by UNDP and MoFEP&D. The overall goal of the donor-
government working group is to propagate a cohesive 
approach in the implementation of climate change 
issues. Nevertheless, development partners are 
considered as the most influential actor since they play 
a critical role by making funds available for climate 
change activities in the agricultural sector. They are 
consistently described as “the strong but invisible hand 
in climate change policies in general and in agricultural 
sector in particular”73. This implies that development 
partners exert significant influence in dictating the 
overall policy direction even when “the strategic policy 
priorities are not in tune with those of domestic policy 
makers and stakeholders”74. On the contrary most 
development partners view their role merely as 
“ensuring that domestic policy instruments are in tune 
with international standards, norms and practices to 
guarantee the attainment of desired strategic objectives 
and outcomes”75.
The main concern was that coordination amongst 
development partners on climate change and 
agriculture policy processes is weak in Malawi even 
though they have a working group. Coordination 
amongst development partners is greatly limited to 
sharing information, and to a limited extent on 
cooperation in resource mobilization and programme 
implementation. According to Cammack, et al., (2003), 
various policy doctrines divide donors as do strategy 
and tactics, and sometimes personalities. This is, inter 
alia, underlined by the recurrent concern among both 
government agencies and CSOs that “[we] lack in 
[development partners] an impartial and honest broker 
on matters of climate change and agricultural policy 
processes”76.
Civil Society Organizations
Civil society organizations active in the realm of 
climate change and agricultural policy processes include 
Box 2: Institutional Arrangement of 
Climate Change Management and 
Coordination
The Government of Malawi has established a Working Group 
on Climate Change championed by the Malawi Government 
through the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and 
Development and the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP). This working group comprises representatives from 
the donor community and principal secretaries from 
government meant to have a cohesive approach in 
implementation of climate change activities. The group is 
co-chaired by Secretary for Economic Planning and 
Development and the UN Resident Coordinator representing 
the development partners. The Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Energy, and Environment through the Environmental Affairs 
Department is the secretariat. UNDP provides supporting roles 
to both the Chair and Secretariat. Further, a task force 
comprising government, civil society and development 
partners has been formed to develop a climate change 
implementation action plan for Malawi. This will allow 
stakeholders to have a common approach and opens 
possibility of pooling resources. The hope is that the Ministry 
of Finance, Economic Planning and Development will 
champion mainstreaming of climate change issues into our 
national development agenda.
Source: Government of Malawi (2008)
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both local and international NGOs. Some of the prominent 
ones include Centre for Environmental Policy and Advice 
(CEPA), Civil Society Network on Agriculture (CISANET), 
Farmers Union of Malawi (FUM), Total Land Care (TLC), 
Fair Malawi, Oxfam International, Trocaire, Christian Aid, 
Dan Church Aid (DCA), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), 
National Association of Smallholder Farmers in Malawi 
(NASFAM), Citizens for Justice (CJ), Churches Action in 
Relief and Development (CARD) and Action Aid Malawi. 
The main area of focus for the CSOs is on advocacy. And 
in order to be effective in policy advocacy, they have 
constituted themselves into the Civil Society Coalition 
on Climate Change (CISONECC). The coalition is chaired 
by Churches Action in Relief and Development (CARD) 
with the Centre for Environmental Policy and Advice 
(CEPA) serving as a secretariat.
As a coalition, CISONECC has prioritized areas of 
advocacy as follows: 1) formulation of a national climate 
change policy; 2) influencing the formulation of national 
disaster risk management policy; 3) mobilization of a 
critical mass of expertise to the UNFCCC Conference of 
Parties; 4) implementation of climate related policies and 
legislation; 5) clarification in coordination of climate 
change issues in Malawi; and 5) capacity building in 
accessing existing climate funding baskets.
The CSOs also engage in research to garner credible 
evidence that can be utilized in their advocacy work. The 
research work is considered as a vital platform “for raising 
the voices and experiences of the ordinary people to be 
incorporated into policy discourses among government 
officials and development partners”77. This particular role 
is fulfilled by CSOs that advocate specifically on climate 
change issues in the agricultural sector. The key players 
in this regard include Farmers Union of Malawi (FUM), 
National Association of Smallholder Farmers in Malawi 
(NASFAM) and Civil Society Network on Agriculture 
(CISANET), and ACT family. It is worth noting that the 
ACT Family coordinates climate change activities within 
the faith based organizations and churches. However, 
the ability of CSOs to fully capture the views of the 
ordinary people and effectively advocate for them in the 
policy processes is limited by lack of adequate of technical 
capacity.
The engagement between government agencies, 
CSOs and development partners is expected to improve 
following the establishment of a national task force on 
climate change. It is tasked to develop a climate change 
implementation action plan for Malawi. It is difficult to 
assess its performance since it is new but its establishment 
increases the likelihood of coming up with a common 
approach to dealing with climate change and agricultural 
policy processes and the possibility of pooling resources 
for implementing various programmes.
Private Sector
Private sector actors are engaged in the climate 
change and agriculture policy processes through micro-
insurance schemes. The main players include the Malawi 
Rural Finance Company (MRFC), Opportunity 
International Bank of Malawi (OIBM), New Building 
Society Bank (NBSB), National Insurance Company (NICO) 
and the National Association of Smallholders Farmers in 
Malawi (NASFAM). These organizations are working in 
partnership with the government and the World Bank. 
The motivation of the private sector’s involvement in the 
climate change and agricultural policy processes is that 
they are “keen to turn climate change into more of an 
opportunity than a curse”78. 
The micro-insurance schemes are described as “a 
means to address loss and damage in developing 
countries particularly vulnerable to climate change” 
(Suarez and Linnerrrooth-Bayer, 2010: 272). The 
consortium of private sector actors are implementing a 
weather indexed crop insurance in Malawi as a strategy 
to cushion farmers against the adverse effects of climate 
change in the agricultural sector. The justification for 
weather indexed insurance schemes is that “while 
promoting their own commercial interests, the companies 
involved would be addressing the concerns of farmers”79. 
It is argued that these schemes enhance the credit 
worthiness of farmers and productivity which, in turn, 
make farmers less vulnerable to drought and other 
related climate change impacts. Although the weather 
indexed insurance was widely characterized as an 
exploitative commercial venture preying on the plight 
of poor farmers by the consortium of profit seeking 
establishments, the private sector commands significant 
influence in climate change and agricultural policy 
processes because of its “significant economic muscle 
bolstered by the dominance of development partners 
in climate change policy matters”80.
Research Institutions
The main role of research institutions is to generate 
knowledge that feeds into the climate change and 
agriculture policy processes. The most active research 
institutions include the Centre of Agriculture Research 
and Development (CARD) at Bunda College of Agriculture, 
Centre for Social Research (CSR) and Leadership in 
Environment and Development (LEAD) Southern Africa 
both at Chancellor College, the Malawi Environmental 
and Endowment Trust (MEET), Coordination Unit for the 
Rehabilitation of the Environment and Chitedze Research 
Station in the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water 
Development (MoAI&WD).
The main concern, however, is that these research 
institutions are unable to advance home grown research 
agenda. This is the case because “the government is 
unable to provide them [research institutions] with 
adequate funds”81. Most of the research projects on 
climate change and agricultural policy processes are 
externally driven. Consequently, these research 
institutions tend to “prioritize research initiatives with 
limited domestic relevance as long as there is ready 
funding attached to them”82.
The weak resource base of the research institutions 
further leverages the dominance of development 
partners in climate change and agricultural policy 
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processes. Since development partners are well endowed 
with resources, they are in a position to dictate research 
programmes which shape key strategic directions of the 
overall climate change policy agenda. They are thus 
equipped with both money and knowledge to drive the 
overall policy agenda in line with their priority interests. 
The dominance of development partners in sponsoring 
research projects in climate change and agriculture policy 
processes makes it difficult for domestic stakeholders to 
readily access the research findings. This somewhat 
undermines the efforts of local actors to strengthen their 
knowledge bases for advocacy on matters of climate 
change in the agricultural sector.
The Media
The media is playing a critical role in the dissemination 
of climate change and agricultural policy processes 
issues. Both print and electronic media are engaged 
either on their own terms or through contracts by specific 
organizations to disseminate information, policies and 
debates about climate issues in the agricultural sector. 
Several radio stations have special programmes 
sponsored or unsponsored on climate change issues in 
the agricultural sector. Community radio stations are 
“particularly instrumental on these matters because of 
their high degree interactive nature and focusing on local 
realities that communities can easily relate to”83. 
Newspapers report on climate change issues in the 
agricultural sector either through general news stories, 
feature articles and special supplements. Through these 
avenues “the media helps quite a lot in setting agenda 
in the realm of climate change in the agricultural sector 
particularly through raising the profile of grassroots 
voices”84.
Annex 2: Overview of 
funding for climate 
change interventions
The global financial architecture for climate change 
activities has evolved tremendously in recent years. The 
expansion of financial resources has been unprecedented. 
The World Bank (2009), for instance, estimated that the 
cost of mitigation could reach US$ 400 billion a year 
between 2010 and 2030 while that of adaptation could 
average US$ 75 billion per year between 2010 and 2050. 
It is generally acknowledged that adequate financial 
flows and investments are a critical aspect of a successful 
global strategy for addressing the adverse effects of 
climate.
The sources of finance directed at climate change 
interventions have multiplied into a mixture of bilateral 
and multilateral funding initiatives (UNFCCC, 2008). In 
this year alone, up to 14 new climate change related 
financing initiatives were announced making the sources 
of funding quite diverse. They, among other things, 
include national exchequers, foreign direct investment, 
official development assistance (ODA), carbon markets 
as well as the financial mechanisms of UNFCCC. The 
proliferation of climate change financing initiatives raise 
concerns about coherence in the global financial 
architecture for climate change. The main concern is that 
the proliferation of the funding initiatives has led to 
unnecessary duplication and inefficient allocation of 
resources. This is mainly due to the fact that most of the 
project based funding streams are not often aligned 
sufficiently with national policies or systems as 
recommended by the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action. 
There is also a concern about the extent to which funds 
are actually additional and not merely a rebranding of 
existing of official development assistance (ODA) (Tanner 
and Allouche, 2011).
Three main sources of climate change funds were 
identified in the agricultural sector in Malawi. These are 
government through the national budget, donors often 
through projects and private sector mainly through 
micro-level insurance schemes. The rest of this annex 
analyses these sources of funding for climate change 
activities in the agricultural sector.
Government Funds
The analysis of government funds to climate change 
activities in the agricultural sector draws heavily from 
the 2011/12 budget. This is important because the 
government introduced a zero deficit budget concept 
which resulted in dramatic decline in grants as a source 
of budget financing from about 30 percent to 21 percent. 
The proportion of grants is expected to decline further 
to 13 percent within the next two years. Despite the 
change, the budget framework maintains its usual 
emphasis on the core sectors of education, agriculture 
and health which took about 34.3 percent of the 2011/12 
budget (CEPA, et al., 2011). The budgetary allocation to 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water 
Development was the second largest at MK 37.7 billion 
representing 12.4 percent of the total budget compared 
to 11.5 percent in the 2010/11 revised budget.
A critical analysis was undertaken to assess the 
budgetary allocations to matters of climate and 
environmental management. Out of a total budget of 
MK 304 billion, MK 90.3 billion representing about 29.7 
percent was allocated to the eight sectors prioritized in 
the NAPA including the Green Belt Initiative. The total 
budgetary allocation to the Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Energy and Environment (MoNRE&E) was MK 2.7 billion 
representing 0.90 percent of the total national budget. 
This is clearly inadequate for a ministry entrusted with 
coordinating implemention of climate change activities 
across all sectors The allocation to MoNRE&E include two 
NAPA sectors of energy and environment (CEPA, et al., 
2011). Table 2 summarizes the budgetary allocations to 
the Ministries and Departments engaged in climate 
change and environmental management programmes.
The review of the budgetary allocations to sectors 
with NAPA interventions shows that the nominal 
aggregates have been increasing over the last four years. 
Many stakeholders argued that these allocations are 
potentially sufficient to address the NAPA orientated 
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interventions but there are concerns with the intra-
sectoral allocation to budget actions. It was consistently 
observed that “these have been extremely weak, 
compromising actions that would directly address NAPA 
interventions”85. The main concern, however, is that the 
aggregate allocation to NAPA sectors as a proportion of 
the national budget has been declining over the last four 
years. This was considered as a huge paradox because 
“issues of managing climate change, natural resources 
and the environment were singled out as one of the 
priority action areas in which case the expectation was 
that public resource allocation would take this into 
account”86.
Most stakeholders were concerned with how the 
Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA) 
is treated within the framework of the national budget. 
It does not feature at all in the NAPA framework and its 
recurrent expenditures fall under the Office of the 
President and Cabinet. The budgetary allocations for 
DoDMA are often lumped up in the contingency vote 
under the Treasury, which for many stakeholders, 
“compromises timely response to natural disasters when 
they strike”. This also makes it difficult to ensure  efficient 
utilization of resources since “the resources are centralized 
while the services are required in rural communities”87. 
The inefficient utilization of the resources is inevitable 
since activities have to directed from the capital city, 
Lilongwe, raising transaction costs enormously.
As stated earlier, the proportion of budgetary 
allocations to the NAPA sectors has been declining 
relative to other sectors. Table 2 below illustrates the 
declining trends in budgetary allocations to the NAPA 
sectors. It, for example, shows that the proportion of 
budgetary allocations to agriculture, environment, lands 
and natural resources, wildlife and culture, health and 
gender are lower than the 2010/11 budgetary allocations. 
This reflects a reduction in emphasis on NAPA sectors in 
spite of the increase in nominal budget allocation from 
MK 86.3 billion in the 2010/11 revised budget to MK 90.3 
billion in the 2011/12 budget estimates for all concerned 
sectors.
There are enormous disparities in the distribution of 
resources between central and local governments. The 
greater proportion of resources is retained at the centre 
yet the NAPA clearly stipulates that the immediate and 
priority interventions should be implemented in the rural 
communities because these are more vulnerable to the 
adverse impacts of climate change. The review indicates 
that of the MK90.3 billion allocation to all sectors involved 
in climate change and environmental management 
programmes only MK 10.8 billion was allocated to local 
councils for the implementation of these programmes. 
This represents 12 percent of the total budgetary 
provision for climate change activities and 3.6 percent 
of the total national budget. There is a further concern 
since of the MK 10.8 billion allocated to local councils, 
MK 10 billion is for the health sector which means, only 
0.8 billion, representing 0.9 percent is available for 
implementation of direct climate change interventions 
in the rest of the sectors.
This is not unique to the climate change sector. There 
have been problems with financial allocations to the 
devolved sectors since the onset of decentralization 
policy reforms over a decade ago (Chiweza, 2005 and 
Chinsinga, 2009). These experiences raise questions 
about the government’s commitment to effective 
implementation of the decentralization policy. However, 
in a broader context, the disparities in the financial 
allocations at these two levels of government raise an 
important aspect of the politics about programme 
Sector Budgetary Allocation in 
2011/12 (Malawi Kwacha)
Budgetary Allocations in 
2011/12 (US$)
Natural Resources, Energy and Environment 2, 742,540,000 16,422,395.20
Human Health 37, 715,020,000 225,838,443.11
Wildlife 26,766,460,000 160,278,208.59
Water 7,270,420,000 43,535,449.10
Gender 1,675,870,000 10,035,149
Green Belt Initiative 200,000 1,197.00
Information and Civic Education 915,120,000 5,479,760.47
Local Councils-Agriculture 517,102,666 3,096,423.14
Local Councils-Gender 127,120,096 76,120.34
Local Councils-Health 9,992,388,280 59,834,660.00
Local Councils-Water 33,478,961 200,472.82
Local Councils-Fisheries 70,330,959 421,143.43
Local Councils-Environment 51,897,175 95,192.66
Local Councils-Forestry 35,333,571 211,578.26
Aggregate for Climate Change and Environment 90,262,611,708 540,494,680.88
National Total 303,724,220,000 1,818,707,904.00
Source: CEPA, MEJN, Christian Aid, COPI (2011)
Table 1: Budgetary Allocations to Ministries and Departments in the Climate 
Change Sector
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implementation of externally driven policy frameworks 
(Tanner and Allouche, 2011). Most of the stakeholders 
argued that there is half hearted commitment to the 
implementation of the NAPA orientated interventions 
“since NAPAs have been formulated in a top down fashion 
with almost negligible input from developing countries”88.
A special focus on the agricultural sector revealed that 
there has been satisfactory performance in the three of 
the four NAPA interventions. Specific targets were clearly 
delineated with the requisite budgetary support. It was 
noted that there is lack of notable progress in the 
development of early warning systems in the sector’s 
budget. However, the apparent success of the sector 
needs to be assessed in the context of the Farm Input 
Subsidy Programme (FISP). In the 2011/12 budget, the 
sector allocated up to MK 33.1 billion (about 86.4 percent) 
of the MK 38.3 billion to actions that relate to the sectoral 
NAPA interventions when budgetary expenditures on 
the FISP are taken into account.
However, when the FISP expenditures are netted off, 
the NAPA budget actions in the sector attract only MK 
10.6 billion (27.8 percent) of the annual budget. FISP 
contributes to adaptation to climate change since the 
programme encourages use of improved crop varieties 
and enhances food security at household level. FISP is 
also a potential contributor to worsening climate change 
effects in the country through the promotion of excessive 
use of inorganic fertilizers. The argument is that excessive 
use of inorganic fertilizers undermines ecological 
sustainability which can accelerate the magnitude of the 
adverse effects of climate change. In the final analysis, 
however, the implementation of the FISP has resulted 
neither from the NAPA nor from the government’s 
commitment to issues of climate change and environment 
management.
Several challenges were identified with the 
government funding stream for climate change activities 
in the agricultural sector. Some of the notable ones 
included the following:
•	 The proportion of budgetary resources to the 
sectors that deal with climate change issues has 
been declining as a proportion of the national 
budget despite increases in the nominal sectoral 
allocations. This does not reflect the designation 
of managing climate change, natural resources 
and the environment as one of the key national 
priorities.
•	 Some of the key sectors such as energy, forestry, 
wildlife, fisheries, information and civic education 
do not have specifically budgeted for activities 
yet there are very critical to the achievement of 
the NAPA objectives and aspirations.
•	 For most sectors, annual budget targets are 
inconsistent from one year to the next and where 
indicators of performance exist, they are not 
consistent over time. This makes it rather difficult 
to definitively assess progress toward the desired 
targets.
•	 Resources are concentrated at the central 
government across all the NAPA sectors. This 
leaves meagre resources for implementation of 
programmes at the local government level which 
Programme Area 2008/09
Approved
2009/10
Approved
2010/11
Approved
Agriculture and food 14.11% 12.57% 15.3%
Integrated Rural Development ----- ---- 1.3%
Environment, Lands and Natural Resources 1.03% 1.47% 1.0%
Tourism, Wildlife and Cultural 0.55% 0.45% 0.5%
Water, Sanitation and Irrigation 3.37% 2.04% 0.3%
Trade, Industry and Private Sector Development 0.49% 0.46% 0.6%
Vulnerability, Disaster and Risk Management ----- 0.15% 0.2%
Health 18.29% 13.24% 23.3%
Education 8.46% 12.22% 20.3%
Gender, Youth 0.69% 0.65% 1.1%
Roads, Public Works and 7.52% 14.87% 7.5%
ICT and Research and Development  0.51% 0.77% 0.5%
Energy and Mining 0.86% 0.10% 0.2%
Economic Governance 2.61% 6.17% 6.4%
Democratic Governance 2.92% 3.98% 11.3%
Public Administration 28.75% 16.21% 10.2%
Statutory and Unforeseen 8.93% 11.04% 0.1%
Source: CEPA, MEJN, Christian Aid, COPI (2011)
Table 2: Trends of Budgetary Allocations to Climate Change Related Sectors
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is closest to the rural communities most 
vulnerable to risks associated with climate 
change.
•	 The lack of consistency in the national budget 
framework, structure and targeting pose 
significant challenges in establishing links 
between resources allocated for specific 
interventions from one year to the other. This 
further threatens the loss of valuable information 
on continuity of actions in focal areas and tracking 
progress thereof over time.
Donor Funds
It is somewhat difficult to fully capture the magnitude 
of resources that donors are investing in climate change 
issues in the agricultural sector. As already stated earlier, 
this is a challenge because the country does not have a 
coherent policy framework for climate change either 
generally or with reference to the agricultural sector. The 
existence of a wide range of policy instruments that have 
at least some bearing on climate change issues in the 
agricultural sector has invariably led to scattered donor 
interventions. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to 
sketch the magnitude of donor support to climate 
change issues in the agricultural sector in Malawi. Table 
3 below summarizes the contributions of major donors 
to the sector as of January 2010 (GoM/UN, 2010).
While there is proliferation of donor supported climate 
change interventions in Malawi, a large proportion of 
donor support is channeled through the National Climate 
Change Programme launched in 2010. According to most 
stakeholders, this programme is designed to mainstream 
and address climate change issues in the national 
development agenda. Its main aim is to build the 
country’s response framework and strategy to support 
national and local government institutions in delivering 
long-term climate resilient and sustainable development.
One of the main programmes implemented is Africa 
Adaptation Programme (AAP). It aims to support long 
term efforts of the government to build capacity to 
successfully implement its own adaptation programmes. 
It stresses on the necessity to develop evidence based 
strategic framework and an implementation plan to 
respond to the challenges that climate change poses to 
sustainable economic development and national food 
security. Through this programme, the following have 
reportedly been achieved: 1) assessment of current 
hazard mapping capacity; 2) financial assessment to 
strengthen capacity and design for dynamic adaptation 
and mitigation; 3) the conceptual analysis on the 
applicability of climate change, environment and natural 
resources sector wide approach (CCENRM SWAp); and 
4) preparations for the development of a climate change 
policy.
Besides the absence of the policy on climate change 
generally and with particular reference to the agricultural 
sector, the difficulty to tracking donor funds in the sector 
is attributed to weak mechanisms for coordination and 
monitoring. As demonstrated earlier, the Department 
of Environmental Affairs (DEA) as a coordinating body 
does not have adequate resources to play its role 
effectively. Many stakeholders argued that “there is 
massive resource flow to the climate change sector in 
Malawi but we simply do not have the capacity to keep 
track of these resources”89. Moreover, the Parliamentary 
Committee on Agriculture and Natural Resources 
(PCANR) is essentially non-functional. Some of the donor 
funds are channeled through NGOs and civil society 
organizations.
Private Sector Funds
The main source of private sector funds is the weather 
indexed insurance schemes which are being implemented 
in Malawi on a pilot basis. These schemes are described 
as “an innovative financial product that has been 
introduced in recent years in countries as diverse as India, 
Malawi, Mongolia and Thailand”90. These schemes are 
justified as a strategy for smallholder farmers to hedge 
against agricultural production risks such as drought or 
floods. The schemes pay out in events that are triggered 
by a publicly observable index such as rainfall recorded 
on a local rain gauge (Gine, 2009). Consequently, these 
payouts can be calculated and disbursed quickly and 
automatically without the need for households to 
formally file a claim.
In Malawi, the consortium of banks and insurance 
companies working in partnership with NASFAM and 
the World Bank piloted the weather indexed insurance 
schemes in Kasungu, Nkhotakota, Lilongwe North and 
Chitedza. The schemes are described as more efficient 
and cost effective than the traditional crop insurance 
schemes. Through these schemes farmers can easily 
access finance and be protected from weather risks in 
the same way as the loan providers. Prior to the launch 
of the pilot weather indexed insurance schemes, it is 
estimated that only 50,000 out of millions of smallholder 
Development Partner Amount in US$
DFID 1,325,000
Norway 2,372,271
Spain 80,000
UNDP 252,375
World Bank/Terra Africa 1,545, 282
Source: Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), January 2011
Table 3: Donor Contributions to Climate Change in Malawi
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Policy Responsible Ministry (ies)
Vision 2020 (1998-2020) Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development
Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) II 
(2012-2016)
Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development
Agricultural Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp) 
(2008-2012)
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development and 
Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development
National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) 
(2005)
Department of Environmental Affairs in the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Energy and Environment
Annex 3: Agricultural sector policies of relevance to climate change
National Strategy for Sustainable Development (2004) Department of Environmental Affairs in the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Energy and Environment
National Forestry Policy (1996) Department of Environmental Affairs in the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Energy and Environment
Community Based Forest Management, a supplement 
to the National Forestry Policy (2003)
Department of Forestry in the Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Energy and Environment
National Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy (2001) Department of Forestry in the Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Energy and Environment
National Strategy for Sustainable Development (2004) Department of Environmental Affairs in the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Energy and Environment
National Forestry Policy (1996) Department of Environmental Affairs in the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Energy and Environment
Community Based Forest Management, a supplement 
to the National Forestry Policy (2003)
Department of Forestry in the Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Energy and Environment
National Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy (2001) Department of Forestry in the Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Energy and Environment
National Energy Policy (2003) Fisheries Department in the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation 
and Water Development
National Land Resources Management Policy and 
Strategy (2000)
Department of Energy Affairs in the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Energy and Environment
Agricultural Research Master Plan (2001) Department of Land Resources Conservation in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development
Food and Nutrition Policy (2005) Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development
National Nutrition Policy Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development
National Irrigation Policy and Development Strategies 
(2000)
Department of HIV, AIDS and Nutrition in the Office of the 
President and Cabinet
National Water Policy (2005) Department of Irrigation in the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation 
and Water Development
National agriculture Extension Policy in the New 
Millennium (2000)
Department of Water in the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation 
and Water Development
National Environmental Health Policy (1999) Department of Extension in the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation 
and Water Development
Malawi Decentralization Policy (1998) Ministry of Health and Population Services
Disaster Preparedness and Management Policy Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
Disaster Preparedness and Management Policy Department of Poverty and Disaster Management Affairs in the 
Office of the President and Cabinet
Source: Jumbe, et al, 2008
farmers in the country were able to secure credit from 
formal financial institutions. The exact magnitude of 
resources invested in weather indexed insurance 
schemes is not known but it is estimated that by 2008 
the consortium had sold farmers policies worth US$ 2.5 
million. Many stakeholders are actually concerned with 
the apparent lack of transparency in the resources flows 
in the industry because “the primary aim of those 
involved is to maximize profit at the expense of poor 
and vulnerable farmers”91.
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Annex 4: Abbreviations
AIDS   Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome
ASWAp  Agricultural Sector Wide Approach
CARD   Centre for Agriculture Research and Development
CARD   Churches Action in Relief and Development
CCENRMSWAp  Climate Change, Environment and Natural Resources Sector Wide Approach
CEPA   Centre for Environmental Policy and Advice
CISANET  Civil Society Network on Agriculture
CISONECC  Civil Society Coalition on Climate Change
CJ   Citizens for Justice
CSOs   Civil Society Organizations
CSR   Centre for Social Research
DCA   Danish Church Aid
DEA   Department of Environmental Affairs
DFID   Department for International Development
DoDMA  Department of Disaster Management Affairs
EU   European Union
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization
FGDs   Focus Group Discussions
FISP   Farm Input Subsidy Programme
FUM   Farmers Union of Malawi
GDP   Gross Domestic Product
GoM   Government of Malawi
HIV   Human Immuno Virus
IDS   Institute of Development Studies
IHS   Integrated Household Survey
LEAD   Leadership in Environment and Development
LMPT   Low Maize Productivity Trap
MEET   Malawi Environmental and Endowment Trust
MGDS   Malawi Growth and Development Strategy
MoAI&WD  Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development
MoFEP&D  Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development 
MoNRE&E  Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Environment
NAPA   National Adaptation Programme of Action
NASFAM  National Association of Smallholder Farmers in Malawi
NCA   Norwegian Church Aid
NGOs   Non Governmental Organizations
NORAD  Norwegian Agency for International Development
NSO   National Statistical Office
ODA   Overseas Development Assistance
PCANR  Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture and Natural Resources
PEI   Poverty Environmental Initiative
TLC   Total Land Care
UN   United Nations
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
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